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This study uses secondary data from the past ten seasons to
explore key issues germane to Major League Baseball.
Focusing on attendance, payroll, performance, and the cost of
attending, several key relationships were identified. Huge
disparities in spending are documented. Perhaps most
importantly, there is a meaningful relationship between
performance and attendance. Equally important is the
concurrent relationship between performance and the team’s
payroll. Other relationships were documented and
suggestions are articulated. These suggestions include future
research and managerial issues such as the implementation
of a hard salary cap and a corresponding salary floor.

INTRODUCTION
The discipline that we now recognize as sports marketing has surged to the forefront of discussions
among marketing practitioners and academicians worldwide. While we would be remiss if we failed
to acknowledge that this discipline comprises two primary domains – mainly the marketing of sports
products and the marketing of nonsports products via of the creation of a sports overlay – we
generally recognize that the discipline is driven by the spectator sports component of the industry.
While the sports that appeal to the marketplace vary significantly from one country to another, two
questions continue to emerge. One of the questions that has circulated across the media and the
blogosphere in the United States since the New York Yankees cruised their way to the 2009 World
Series championship is that of whether or not the wealthier teams are simply buying championships.
More succinctly stated: is a team’s payroll directly correlated with a team’s performance on the field
of play?
The second commonly posed question concerns the relationship between winning and attendance.
Logic would imply that a winning team represents a superior product. Common wisdom is that
consumers – fans in this case – are willing to pay premium prices for higher quality products. Thus
two questions emerge. What is the nature of the relationship between the number of games won
during the regular season and the number of fans in the seats? And since higher costs generally
translate into higher prices, what is the relationship between payroll and the cost of attending an
MLB game? In line with these questions is that of whether or not there is a meaningful relationship
between the cost of attending and the number of wins accrued by the typical MLB team.
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While questions such as these are relevant to any sport in any country, this study will focus on Major
League Baseball in the United States. We begin with a brief look at a major point of distinction
between spectator sports and a typical industry such as the automotive manufacturing sector. With
the key differences delineated, the focus will then shift to that of examining the extant literature.
SPECTATOR SPORTS: A PARADOXICAL PARADIGM
In mainstream industry, higher costs associated with the production of a product generally translate
into a competitive disadvantage. Recently, Ford Motor Company sought concessions from its labor
force so that it would be on a level playing field as it sought to compete head-to-head with General
Motors and Chrysler. When the United Auto Workers voted not to grant these concessions, the
immediate response by Ford management was that the cost disadvantage under which Ford was
operating would have negative consequences in the future. Ironically, such arguments are seldom
articulated in professional sports; this is particularly true for Major League Baseball. While the
small market teams bemoan the fact that they are at a disadvantage because they don’t have as
much money to spend on their labor force, the large market teams continue to entice the best free
agents with lucrative contract offers. The New York Yankees’ payroll for 2009 was approximately
$202 million dollars. This included $35.91 million spent on the two top free agents in the off-season
signing period, C. C. Sabathia and Mark Teixiera. Yet at the same time, there are numerous
examples of teams spending small fortunes on their roster and failing to make the playoffs or even
play at a level above the five hundred (.500) clip. One of the best recent examples involved the 2008
Detroit Tigers. After acquiring a bevy of new players including Dontrelle Willis and Miguel Cabrera,
the fans’ confidence swelled along with the team’s payroll. However, the league’s second highest
payroll of nearly $139 million dollars failed to achieve an acceptable return on that investment. The
team won less than 46 percent of its games and fell far short of making the postseason playoffs. Yet
the fans’ hope prior to the opening game of the season caused ticket sales to surge well beyond the
team’s original expectation. So, some might ask if a large payroll creates expectations that result in
advance ticket sales prior to the start of the season such that an unanticipated failure to perform on
the field does not ultimately result in a significant decline for that particular season. Conversely, an
overachieving team with a smaller payroll might have more ticket sales during the course of the
season. Thus, it could be that performance is a direct influence on season attendance. Such is the
paradox associated with professional sports, especially those such as MLB that do not impose a hard
salary cap on team payrolls.
Another anomaly is the relationship between price and demand. Higher prices are typically
associated with lower levels of demand. Such a relationship may not be the case for spectator sports.
Consumers are known to pay for quality irrespective of the industry under scrutiny. We pay more for
a Lexus than we do for a similar Toyota. The Lexus may be better, or it may simply be perceived as a
superior product. Regardless of the reality, Lexus prices are higher. Thus it may be that higher
ticket prices are deemed acceptable when those prices can be attributed to the purchase of a superior
product. For instance, despite having the highest average ticket price in Major League Baseball
($72.97), the New York Yankees drew the second largest attendance for the 2009 season
(3,7819,358), some 42,000 patrons fewer than the league leading Los Angeles Dodgers.
LITERATURE
This research began with an examination of the ABI-Inform bibliographic database. Relevant
literature was also sought via a search of the Sports Business Research Network (SBR Net). The
logical starting point was an effort involving a search seeking the concurrent use of the four main
constructs germane to this particular study – attendance, performance, payroll, and ticket prices – in
a single article. When the search was limited to the abstracts, only one article surfaced.
Interestingly, that article, “Systems Approach to Baseball Player’s Compensation” is some 29 years
old (Silverman, 1981). So while we often hear discussions about the nexus of these four variables,
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little research has been done in an effort to provide explanations from either a statistical perspective
or a more pragmatic managerial implications perspective. Thus the search process was changed to
look at the key subsets of six distinct pairs of the variables under scrutiny. Of these six pairs,
pertinent literature was found for five. Only the relationship between payroll and attendance was
devoid of any meaningful research. The following literature review documents the body of knowledge
as it relates to the relationships within the other five pairs of variables.
Payroll and Performance
At the forefront of the literature that explores spending on salaries in Major League Baseball is the
book, Moneyball, by Michael Lewis (2003). Among the assertions put forth in this oft-cited book is
that the baseball labor market is mispriced. As a consequence, it is argued that many teams inflate
their payrolls in an unproductive effort to improve their performance on the field of play. Early
studies appear to support this premise. Zimbalist (1992) noted that the variation in team payroll
explained less than ten percent of the variation in performance (as measured by winning percentage)
between 1984 and 1989. In a more recent examination of this phenomenon in MLB from 1990
through 1996, Quirk and Fort (1999) were unable to document the presence of any relationship
between these two variables. While it is believed that this weak or even nonexistent relationship was
the case for many years, there is an emerging belief that more attention is now being paid to the link
between salary and performance. Supporting this premise is the finding that the correlation between
a team’s payroll and its winning percentage has improved dramatically in recent years (Hakes and
Sauer, 2007). More recently, Jane, San and Ou (2009) documented both the presence of and the
direction of a causal relationship whereby a team’s performance was directly (and positively)
impacted by its annual expenditure on player salaries. In essence, it is believed that a more attentive
mindset emerged with Billy Beane’s exploitation of this phenomenon (commonly referred to as
Sabermetrics) during his tenure as the Oakland Athletics general manager over a five-season period
from 1999 through 2003. It is further believed that this mantle has been passed down to Dan
O’Dowd, general manager of the Colorado Rockies (Van Riper, 2009). Yet despite this transition,
outcry against the big spenders is still commonplace. The culmination of the 2009 World Series was
often punctuated by critical accusations that the Yankees had bought yet another championship with
the best team that money could buy (Reiter, 2009). As such, we have witnessed renewed calls for a
salary cap in Major League Baseball (Marchman, 2009).
Interestingly, the underlying premise of Moneyball has gained popularity outside of the realm of
sports. Some money managers have embraced the philosophy that “past performance does indicate
future performance” (Chernoff, 2003, 1). While acknowledging that the concept is not universally
embraced by money managers, a leading University of Chicago behavioral financial theorist, Richard
Thaler, opined that from Moneyball, “investors can learn to pay attention to statistics, and avoid
risky markets where chances of finding winners in the kettle are not all that high” (ibid.).
Attendance and Performance
Hall, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2002) offer their assessment that the link between payroll and
performance “plays a central role in the theory of team sports but is seldom investigated empirically”
(p. 149). So, why do some teams make such a concerted effort to buy talent? It has long been argued
that winning and attendance go hand-in-hand for most teams. However, despite this assertion, it has
been stated that the direction of any causal relationship is not so apparent (Davis, 2008; Jane, San
and Ou, 2009). Irrespective of this shortcoming, it is generally accepted that one of the components
that influence attendance at sports events is the “quality of the competition featured at the event”
(Armstrong, 2008, p. 218). While this might well encompass the collective talent on the rosters of
both teams, many consumers of the spectator sports product focus primarily upon the talent of the
team for which they have a rooting interest. In this regard, there is a stream of research which has
shown that fans subjectively evaluate the probability that their team will win a game. And based
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upon that probability, their decision to attend a game is impacted. Interestingly, Knowles, Sherony,
and Haupert (1992) estimated that attendance is maximized when the home team’s probability of
winning is .60. Another study by Rascher (1999) offered his estimate that it is a probability of .66
that results in the attainment of the maximum number of fans who choose to attend a game.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the correlation between attendance and performance has
strengthened in recent years (Schmidt and Berri, 2006). Interestingly, there is some research that
indicates that uncertainty is a driver of attendance (Pinnuck and Potter, 2006). Thus, greater
attendance for a game would be expected where there is an a priori expectation that either team
might well win. Consequently, even the best MLB teams may find that attendance spikes when a
quality opponent visits.
Payroll and the Cost of Attending
As early as 1978, the literature on professional sports began to explore the relationship between
team payrolls and the cost of attending a game. Major League Baseball has been noted because of
the strength of its union (the MLBPA), the court case (by St. Louis Cardinals’ player Curt Flood) that
led to the inception of free agency as we know it today, and the salary arbitration process that is now
available to less-experienced players. After free agency began in the 1970s, it was posited that the
resultant increases in the salaries of MLB players had inflated ticket prices (Staudohar, 1978). There
is credence given to the argument that these higher player salaries have had a direct impact on the
cost of attending an MLB game. In 1998, it was noted that eight of the ten teams with the highest
aggregate payrolls were teams that fell within the list of the ten teams with the highest average
ticket prices (Fatsis, 1998).
More recently, a terse question was posed: “How have player salaries ruined baseball?” The two
most commonly articulated replies to that question are that the trend has destroyed competitive
balance and that these high salaries have resulted in higher ticket prices (Glazer, 2002). However,
there are some detractors to those arguments. The detractors argue that the steep increase in ticket
prices is not a result of increased player salaries; rather, it can be attributed to a heightened interest
in baseball on the part of the fans and the construction of smaller ballparks – a phenomenon which
has essentially decreased the supply of seats available to the fans. So, the argument is that it has
been this increase in demand coupled with a concurrent reduction in supply which precipitated the
dramatic increases in ticket prices over the past 15 years (Glazer, 2002). Therefore, if we accept a
basic premise of macroeconomic theory, then the equilibrium price should have been expected to
creep higher. This is the same argument put forth by Jonathan Mariner, CFO of the Florida Marlins,
when he stated that “it’s supply and demand. You charge more because you have more demand for
tickets…and nicer facilities.” Nowhere does Mariner say that ticket prices went up because payroll
went up. In fact, he could not offer this as a reason because the Marlins’ ticket prices had increased
despite a dramatic reduction in payroll (Fatsis, 1998). In an extension of the assessment of the cost
of attending, one recent study expanded the focus beyond ticket prices. Coates and Humphreys
(2007) used the Fan Cost Index (FCI) as the independent variable. The FCI takes into account the
aggregate cost for a family of four to attend a major professional sports event in North America.
Their research covered three of the four major North American leagues (the NHL was omitted). The
evidence emanating from this study appeared to document the fact that fans are somewhat
ambivalent in regard to the price of tickets since the nature of the demand curve was found to be
inelastic.
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Attendance and the Cost of Attending
Much of the published material on pricing is from the popular press. One article in SportBusiness
International offered the assessment that fans are turned off by high prices (Smith, 2005). An earlier
article was more critical as evidenced by its title: “Hey Fans, Sit on It” (Swift, 2000). The prevailing
argument is that we are witnessing the act of pricing the everyday fan out of the game. A more
comprehensive perspective of the cost of attending goes beyond a simple look at the price of a ticket.
As noted earlier, a commonly articulated measure is the Fan Cost Index (FCI). This measure,
available from Team Marketing Report, incorporates a number of likely purchases associated with
attending a sports event. As such, the FCI includes the cost of tickets, parking, a designated menu of
food and beverages, game-day programs, and commonly-purchased souvenirs. During the period
from 1991 through 1998, the FCI for a MLB game increased by 48.3% while the corresponding rate
of general inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose only 20%. According to
Burton and Howard (1999, p. 41), the preponderance of both the empirical evidence and public
opinion “indicates middle-class and blue-collar fans have been pushed out of stadiums and arenas,
replaced by more affluent spectators.” Negative commentary such as this led Fullerton (2010, p.
534) to offer his assessment that “price is perhaps the most criticized aspect of the strategies
employed by marketers of spectator sports.” This begs the earlier question as to whether or not
there is a relationship such that higher team payrolls contribute to higher prices that make it more
difficult for real fans to attend games as part of the live audience.
In an interesting twist on his Moneyball treatise, Lewis (2008) attempted to develop a model
designed to determine an MLB team’s optimal payroll based upon the size of the population living
within a team’s primary geographic market. The underlying objective was to determine how much a
team should spend in order to maintain a measure of competitive balance within the league while
working under the assumption that there will be a revenue-sharing mechanism by which smallermarket teams are subsidized by large-market teams. So while the size of the population is a factor, it
is still incumbent upon ownership and management to invest wisely when it comes to the team’s
aggregate payroll.
Performance and the Cost of Attending
There is little in the way of empirical research that has explored the relationship between
performance and the cost of attending. Yet most fans can articulate stories about how their favorite
team’s ticket prices increased in the aftermath of a successful season. Postseason games by definition
feature two high-performing teams, and the prices for post-season tickets are generally considerably
higher than are tickets for the same seats during the regular season. Another recent phenomenon
that addresses this relationship is the move by MLB teams to implement so-called variable pricing.
However, in many cases, the quality measure is one reflecting the visiting team rather than the
home team. For instance, the Detroit Tigers have designated games against quality opponents such
as the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees as premium games. These games carry a higher
published ticket price than do games against teams that simply are not as talented. Thus there is
some anecdotal evidence of this relationship.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Two distinct assessment periods are addressed in this study. First to be examined is the 2009
season. Then the ten-year period from 2000 through 2009 is subjected to the same scrutiny.
Therefore, any relationships among the variables in the data set are addressed from both a shortterm and a long-term perspective.
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For both timeframes, the objective is one of identifying relationships between sets of relevant
variables that are commonly discussed in the media and by the fans. As such, the eight objectives
germane to this study are to determine the nature of the relationship between:
9 attendance and performance (as measured by the number of games won);
9 team payroll (measured in constant (2009) dollars) and performance;
9 a team payroll index (a team’s payroll compared to average payroll) and performance;
9 team payroll (measured in constant (2009) dollars) and ticket prices (in constant dollars);
9 performance and ticket prices (measured in constant (2009) dollars);
9 attendance and ticket prices (measured in constant (2009) dollars);
9 attendance and the Fan Cost Index (FCI) (measured in constant (2009) dollars); and
9 attendance and team payroll (measured in constant (2009) dollars).
METHODOLOGY
Data were gathered from an array of reputable secondary sources. These sources include MLB.com,
ESPN.com, teammarketing.com, and the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov/CPI/). The data collected covered a ten-season period from 2000 through 2009. The
database consisted of the team’s payroll and a payroll index. This index was calculated by dividing a
team’s payroll by the average payroll for the year under scrutiny. For example, the Yankees’ 2009
payroll was $201,449,289 while the average team payroll was $88,336,287. The resultant payroll
index of 2.28 indicates that the Yankees’ payroll was 228 percent of the average team payroll (or 128
percent more) for the 2009 season. Since dollar values are impacted by inflation, the dollar amount
was also indexed. By using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), each payroll was adjusted so as to be
stated in 2009 dollars. The number of wins and the aggregate home attendance were included within
the database. The average ticket price and the corresponding Fan Cost Index (FCI) were gleaned
from statistics published by Team Marketing Report. The final piece of data was a dummy variable
that was used to indicate whether or not the team had moved into a new stadium at the start of the
season. Other than the issue of moving into a new stadium which was coded as a binary (0, 1)
variable, each of the other variables in the data set produced ratio-scaled data.
When the analyses were performed for the 2009, the current dollar values were used for payroll,
ticket prices, and the Fan Cost Index. When the ten-year assessments were done, current dollars
were transformed. In some analyses, the dollar amounts for the years 2000 through 2009 were
indexed using 2009 as the base year; thus each measure reflects the equivalent cost expressed in
terms of the 2009 dollar. The indexing criterion was the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as of April of
the corresponding year. April was used as it represents the opening of the MLB season.
Each of the research objectives was assessed using bivariate (Pearson) correlation analysis.
However, since the data - in essence - represent a census, measures of statistical significance were
deemed inappropriate. So rather than report this measure, assessments are made regarding the
managerial – or practical – significance of the findings.
RESULTS
A number of the pairs of variables articulated in the research objectives section exhibited correlation
coefficients that are best characterized as managerially significant. Such relationships were
documented in both the one-year and the ten-year studies.
Attendance and Performance
The initial objective was that of determining the nature of the relationship between a team’s
attendance and its performance. For the 2009 season, the top performing team with 103 victories
and a World Series title was the New York Yankees; the team drew a total of 3,719,358 fans to the
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park for their 81 regular season home games. This attendance placed the Yankees second in MLB –
falling a mere 42,000 fans behind the Los Angeles Dodgers. Conversely, the worst performing team
was the Washington Nationals. Their 59 wins translated into a season attendance of 1,817,280. This
figure placed the team 25th out of the 30 MLB teams. This anecdotal evidence of a relationship
between these two variables is further supported by the corresponding coefficients of correlation. For
the 2009 season, that measure was .680 whereas the comparable figure for the ten-year period was
.524. The correlation is in the sought direction as there is a direct relationship between the two
variables. Higher levels of performance are accompanied by higher levels of attendance.
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients are reasonably high. Yet at the same time, it is apparent
that other factors are perhaps even more important. The coefficient of determination (r2) of .462 for
2009 and .275 for the aggregate period implies that more than half of the variation in attendance is
determined by factors other than performance. Still, the results provide some credence to the
argument that paying to bring in quality free agents can represent a good investment if the free
agents contribute to produce a better product on the field of play. This assertion begs the question as
to whether or not higher payrolls do, in fact, translate into better performance as measured by the
number of wins achieved by the team during the course of the regular season.
Payroll and Performance
Objective two was that of determining the nature of the relationship between a team’s payroll and its
performance. For the 2009 season, the actual dollar amounts are used. However, for the ten-year
study, the payroll figures were adjusted so as to eliminate the confounding impact of inflation. To
accomplish this adjustment, the salary data for 2000 through 2008 were indexed using 2009 as the
base year. As a result, each payroll figure is expressed in terms of its equivalent value vis-à-vis the
2009 dollar. In each case, a meaningful result was in evidence. For the 2009 season, the coefficient of
correlation for the pairing of team payroll and performance was .504. Likewise, the corresponding
measure for the ten-year period was .458. Once again, the direction of the relationship was positive
and the coefficient was moderately high. Thus, it can be concluded that there is a meaningful
relationship that is characterized by higher payrolls producing a higher level of performance on the
field. And while there are exceptions to this rule – after all, the correlation coefficient was not 1.0 –
teams that spend the least on payroll tend to be among the poorest performers. Furthermore, the
stronger relationship in 2009 supports the earlier assertion by Hakes and Sauer (2003) that the
ability of general managers to make wiser decisions regarding player acquisition continues to
improve. However, it somewhat contradicts research by baseball statistician Tom Tango whose
research indicated that the measure of correlation between spending and performance in MLB was
.63 (Cameron, 2009).
The third objective used a meaningful manipulation of the salary data. Rather than looking at dollar
amounts, a payroll index was calculated. As such, the measure reflects a team’s level of spending
relative to the league-wide average. The rationale is that it may not be how much a team spends;
rather it is how much each team spends in comparison to its opponents that is more important as a
mediating variable that impacts performance. As such, a payroll index of 200 is characteristic of a
team that spent two times that of the average team on its payroll. Conversely, an index of 50
indicates that the team under scrutiny spent only half as much on its players as did the average
team in the year in question. Once more, meaningful correlations were documented. For the 2009
season, the measure was .504. For the ten-year period, it was .465. Interestingly, the correlation
coefficient for the 2009 season (.504) was exactly the same as that resulting from the use of the
actual payroll (as would be expected). For the ten year period, the use of the index produced a
slightly higher correlation coefficient (.465) than that which was achieved when using the inflation
adjusted payroll (.458). Each of these measures supports the premise that spending money on player
salaries will result in enhanced performance as measured by the team’s number of wins.
Payroll and Ticket Prices
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The fourth objective begins the examination of ticket prices. For virtually every industry, higher
production costs translate into higher prices for buyers. Thus the question is a simple one. Does a
higher payroll result in higher ticket prices? Using raw cost data for 2009, the coefficient of
correlation was .836. Similar, albeit somewhat weaker, results were found when the adjusted cost
data over the ten year period were used. In that analysis, the value of r was .644. Coefficients of
correlation exceeding .8 are rare in this type of empirical study of actual market conditions. But the
reality is that the results may surprise few people, especially the critics of Major League Baseball.
Those who argue that professional sports are pricing the fan out of the game will point to results
such as these while declaring that the high salaries paid to today’s athletes are detrimental and may
ultimately drive the everyday fan away from the stadium in favor of experiencing the game as a
member of the media-based audience.
Ticket Prices and Performance
Objective five involves the assessment of the relationship between ticket prices and performance.
Conventional wisdom would lead one to believe that since higher salaries produce more wins, then it
is only logical to assume that there would also be a meaningful positive relationship between ticket
prices and performance. Such is indeed the case; however, the relationship may not be as strong as
one might have envisioned. For the 2009 season, the observed measure of correlation was .400. For
the ten year period, prices were adjusted to account for inflation in the same way that payroll data
have been adjusted so as to be stated in terms of the dollar in 2009. For this longer period, the
observed coefficient of correlation was even lower at .301. These results indicate that there are a
myriad of factors other than performance in any given year that influence ticket prices. For instance,
it is well documented that ticket prices escalate between 10 and 25 percent when an MLB team
moves into a new stadium (Fullerton, 2010). So the reality is that some fans appear to receive a
bargain while watching higher quality teams whereas other fans pay a premium for tickets to watch
inferior teams.
Ticket Prices and Attendance
The sixth objective addresses the relationship between ticket prices and attendance. As noted
earlier, most industries face the reality that higher prices for their products translate into lower
levels of demand. Major League Baseball is not burdened by the reality of an elastic demand curve.
For the recently completed 2009 season, the relationship between these two variables was captured
by a coefficient of correlation of .596. Using the inflation adjusted prices for the past ten seasons, the
comparable measure was slightly lower at .546. Yet the most compelling aspect of these statistics is
that the relationship is positive. In other words, higher prices are associated with higher attendance.
This might cause one to ponder whether higher prices create higher demand or if higher demand
drives ticket prices up. Alternatively, the real issue could be that both of these variables are related
to performance. A better product sells for higher prices while simultaneously attracting more
interested buyers.
Fan Cost Index and Attendance
The seventh objective addresses the relationship between attendance and the Fan Cost Index (FCI).
As noted earlier, the FCI is a measure that estimates the total cost for a family of four to attend a
baseball game in each city. In 2009, the FCI for MLB was $196.89. The FCI not only includes four
average-priced tickets ($26.64), but it also takes into account an array of other likely expenditures
(Team Marketing Report, 2009). As might be expected, the FCI is strongly correlated with ticket
prices. For example, the correlation coefficient for 2009 was .977. For the 2000-09 period, the
measure was .956. Despite these high values, it was decided that this analysis should still be
included since many outside observers are quick to include the costs specific to the FCI as factors
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that might push some fans away. The correlation coefficients resulting from the assessment of the
relationship between the FCI and attendance closely approximate those from when ticket prices
were used instead of the FCI. For 2009, the figure was .585. As with ticket prices, when the
examination involves a monetary unit over the ten year period, the dollar amount was adjusted to
reflect constant dollars. Taking this adjusted measure into account, the corresponding statistic for
the ten-year period was .568. Higher values for the fan cost index are associated with higher
attendance. Once more, the likely explanation is that better teams can command higher prices for
their tickets and for the various concessions sold at the stadium. So if we were to try to assign cause
and effect, it is likely that higher attendance is the cause while the higher cost of attending is the
effect.
Attendance and Team Payroll
The eighth and final objective is a simple look at the relationship between attendance and the team’s
payroll. As noted earlier, there is no meaningful literature to document any significant research that
has examined this relationship. Perhaps this is because of the presumed multicollinearity within the
data set that would lead one to assume that payroll’s impact on attendance is mediated by way of
performance. Still, this pair of variables does merit some attention. For the 2009 season, the
resultant coefficient of correlation was .759. When the focus shifts to the decade encompassing the
2000 through 2009 seasons, the coefficient exhibits a virtually identical value of .760.
Overview
It is evident that there are meaningful correlations among the set of variables under scrutiny in the
current study. This is true whether the focus is on the single 2009 season or the longer period that
includes ten years of data starting with the 2000 season. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of the
correlation analyses discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
Table 1
Results of Correlation Analysis: 2009 Season
Performance

Performance
1

Attendance
.

Payroll

Ticket Price

Attendance

.680

1

Payroll

.504

.759

1

Ticket Price

.400

.596

.836

1

FCI

.407

.585

.797

.977

FCI

1
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Table 2
Results of Correlation Analysis: 2000-09 Seasons
Payroll

Indexed
Ticket Price

Performance

Performance
1

Attendance
.

Attendance

.524

1

Payroll (indexed)

.458

.760

1

Ticket Price (indexed)

.301

.546

.644

1

FCI (indexed)

.304

.568

.644

.956

FCI

1

DISCUSSION
Spending on player payroll appears to pay off. However, the overarching caveat is that it is not just
about spending money; rather it is about spending it wisely. Expenditures that do not improve a
team’s performance may go unrewarded at the box office. This confirms the basic premise put forth
by Lewis (2003) in his popular book, Moneyball. In documenting the success of Oakland Athletics
General Manager, Billy Beane, the key was about investing in players who would provide a
meaningful return on the investment. Beane put forth the argument that some positions are more
valuable than others. Thus, there is more to consider than player statistics. So, two teams with
identical payrolls may have vastly different results on the field of play. As noted in the Wall Street
Journal, “supersize payrolls” do not guarantee a team’s success. The 2003 Detroit Tigers paid
approximately $1.3 million for each of its 43 victories that season, hardly representing a sound ROI
(St. John, 2003).
Further exacerbating the decision to invest large sums of money in long-term player contracts is the
reality that the coefficient of correlation for payroll and performance hovers around .5. Undoubtedly,
general managers would like to see that number move higher. Of course the critics will tell them
that the correlation would be stronger if only they would quit making bad investments. Mike
Hampton signed an eight-year contract to pitch for the Colorado Rockies. The first-year return on
the field of play for their $15.1 million per year investment was a record of 14-13 with an Earned
Run Average (ERA) of 5.12. This was followed the next season with a record of 7-15 to accompany his
ERA of 6.15. Bad investments have led to teams dumping salary. While most MLB contracts are
guaranteed, teams either trade high salary players or refrain from resigning them when their
contracts expire. One team with a history of dumping salary is the Florida Marlins. In 2009, we saw
it with the Cleveland Indians. In that same off-season, the Detroit Tigers traded players (Curtis
Granderson), refrained from re-signing its own free agents (Placido Polanco), and promoted rookies
to the 2010 roster (Austin Jackson) in an effort to reduce its $132 million payroll.
It might be wise to look at individual teams over time. It could be that the observed relationships are
less pronounced in some markets. For instance, the Chicago Cubs – often relegated to being
recognized as the lovable losers – may find that attendance is relatively stable irrespective of its
performance on the field. As such, it might impact the mindset of a team’s new owners and general
manager as they contemplate investing to bring in free agents or to retain their current players over
time. Alternatively, a team like the Detroit Tigers finds that its attendance is strongly tied to the
performance of the team. Thus, the onus may be on management to invest in players who can
immediately contribute to the success of the team even if they are seeking to reduce the payroll for
the upcoming season.
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Another key question is one of a lag. Perhaps attendance is more a function of preseason
expectations. Teams that are expected to perform well often see dramatic increases in the preseason
sale of season tickets, partial season tickets, and individual game tickets prior to the first pitch of the
season being thrown. These optimistic ticket buyers may abandon the team such that empty seats
for which tickets were sold ultimately count in the attendance figure. Or these tickets may be sold on
the secondary ticket market at prices far below their face value. Thus, an underperforming team
may have a higher level of attendance than its actual performance would deserve – or than it
actually drew to the stadium. But some of these buyers will still show up because they bought the
tickets even though their expectations have diminished in conjunction with the team’s performance.
Thus, it might be the following season when the real decline in ticket sales is incurred as many fans
opt not to renew their season tickets.
There are also a number of uncontrollable variables that influence performance and attendance. Key
players get injured. They cannot contribute, but they still get paid. Players emerge unexpectedly as
high performers. Rookies have great seasons or a veteran player has a breakout year. These players
may be locked into contracts such that they are unable to reap the rewards that they and their
agents feel they deserve. The bottom line is that they produce positive results, often at bargain
prices. However, when it comes time for arbitration or free agency, they will be able to reap the
benefits of their past production. Going back to Billy Beane in Moneyball, he states that it is
essential for players to be paid for what they can provide in the future rather than what they have
done in the past. As a result, older high profile athletes such as Barry Bonds may find that there is
little or no demand for their services. Other uncontrollable factors involve the visiting team. A higher
quality team on the schedule may bring in more of your own fans to the game whereas a visiting
team that travels well may result in an influx of fans of the opposing team. In this era of interleague
play and unbalanced schedules, this aspect of the competition varies significantly from year to year.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING PRACTITIONERS
As in this study, much of the previous research has directly investigated attendance as a key
dependent variable. While this is important, it may be more meaningful if the focus is shifted from
attendance to revenue. For starters, the same levels of attendance in Pittsburgh and Boston produce
substantially different levels of revenue for the two teams. Further exacerbating this disparity is the
impact of the additional sources of revenue germane to MLB. Specifically, Boston generates
substantially more revenue in terms of their media contracts (e.g. NESN), the sale of licensed
merchandise, and traditional sponsorships. Though not pertinent for Boston, another key source of
revenue for some teams is venue naming rights. For instance, the New York Mets reportedly
received $20 million per year from Citigroup for naming rights for the team’s new stadium, Citi
Field. So while it is important to put “butts in the seats,” it may not be the most important source of
revenue for a team, especially a successful, large-market team.
Fans are willing to pay for quality. Properly done, increased spending on payroll manifests itself in
terms of a higher quality team. Higher quality means more wins which translates into higher
demand. The resultant increases in demand help to create an inelastic demand curve which in turn
provides pricing flexibility (Pan, Zhu, Gabert and Brown 1999; Fort 2004; Coates and Humphreys,
2007). This pricing flexibility produces increases in revenue which allow the team to overcome the
cost disadvantage incurred as a result of the increased payroll. Yet not every fan can afford to pay for
top-priced tickets. Concurrently, management should not want to relegate these less affluent fans to
the media-based audience. In this regard, market segmentation is a critical component of their
strategy. Value pricing and bundling strategies can be used to appeal to these fans, especially for
games that are less attractive to the fans. Among the opportunities available to marketers of MLB is
that of entering into a collaborative effort with a sponsor. In that way, two objectives are being
accomplished. More fans are in the seats while the sponsor is provided with an effective way to
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leverage its relationship with the team. A good example is the discount pricing provided by the
Houston Astros for fans who bring an empty can of the team sponsor’s (Coca-Cola) product to the box
office.
Research in other sports has documented the impact that parity can have on aggregate attendance.
In essence, parity creates a higher level of uncertainty as to the likely final outcome of a competition.
In a study of the Australian Football League, it was concluded that the “greater amount of
‘uncertainty’ surrounding the outcome of any match, the greater the attendance is likely to be”
(Pinnuck and Potter, 2006, 54). Such parity is addressed in sports such as the NBA and the NHL
with a relatively hard salary cap. Baseball uses the draft and a luxury tax in its effort to strive for
some semblance of parity. However, Major League Baseball does not have a hard salary cap, hence
the dramatic disparity in team payrolls. In 2009, the highest payroll belonged to the New York
Yankees while the lowest belonged to the Florida Marlins. The difference was a staggering
$164,635,289. Part of this difference can be attributed to the ability of large market teams to
generate huge sums of revenue from their media contracts and various forms of sponsorship such as
venue naming rights. Yet part of it comes from the reluctance of team ownership and management to
spend the money required to put a competitive team on the field. This reality has led some observers
to offer two suggestions to MLB. First, there should be consideration of the implementation of a hard
salary cap. No longer should teams be allowed to spend more than the soft cap stipulates by simply
paying a luxury tax. Secondly, if there is a ceiling, there should be a floor. With such a stipulation in
place, each team would be required to spend at least the designated minimum amount on its player
payroll. The assumption is that they would not want to overpay a group of below average players;
therefore they would invest in better players who would help them win more games – and attract
more paying customers. While not wanting all 30 teams to end up with a record of 81-81, it is
believed that the presence of a ceiling and a floor would create greater parity within MLB. According
to Bob DuPuy, the COO of MLB, “There are still concerns at the top and bottom. The goal would be
to get a tighter range that would ensure that even more than 20 clubs at Labor Day would still have
a chance to compete for playoff spots – that playoff spots are based on skill and talent and
blossoming stars and not just on plugging holes with economics” (Wilner, 2006, p. 8).
The fact that a stronger relationship between payroll and performance has been documented
indicates that team management is doing a better job in the task of signing players who will make a
meaningful contribution to the team. Of interest though is the pervasive question of how a team’s
payroll is dispersed among its members. Is there a great deal of variation in the way it is dispersed
among the players, or is the pay comparatively uniform? In the Chinese Professional Baseball
League (CPBL), better performance tends to be associated with teams where the disparity is modest.
Referred to as the Equity Theory, the assertion is that teams with a larger disparity (e.g. a team with
a couple of high-priced stars and a number of role players) have a lower level of performance than do
teams that feature no stars and few role-players (DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker, 2004). However,
the CPBL is characterized by limited mobility of players as the issue of free agency as we see in the
United States is not applicable. However, if MLB does move to a hard salary cap, then this issue
might be worth re-examining as management seeks to put the best team on the field.
Of interest here is the aforementioned study by Silverman (1981). He articulated the idea that
players should receive a specified portion of a player pool, and he further postulated that such a plan
would result in a natural migration of players to teams with less talented players thereby securing
greater compensation for themselves. As a consequence, greater parity – and thus uncertainty of
outcomes – would exist. While such rationing of resources based on a systems management approach
would never be accepted by either the players’ unions or ownership, the idea of a salary cap
combined with a salary floor may serve in a similar capacity.
Investments in players will lead to higher ticket prices. As such, these investments must be
successful in the objective of improving (or at least maintaining) the quality of the product.
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Otherwise, the fans who have historically been part of the live audience may transition back to
becoming members of the media-based audience. The casual fan may simply forgo live events in
favor of TV, Web-based broadcasts, or reception on a mobile device. Season ticket holders may balk
and drop their purchases completely or cut back from a full season to a partial season package.
Consequently, care must be taken when negotiating extensions with current players (Ryan Howard
and the Philadelphia Phillies) or new contracts with high profile free agents (Ken Griffey, Jr. and the
Seattle Mariners). More scrutiny should be paid, not only to the amount of money offered, but also to
the number of years covered. While there were few concerns articulated in regard to Ken Griffey’s
one-year contract, the day the five-year deal with Ryan Howard was announced, a number of pundits
on networks such as ESPN expressed their belief that Howard’s value would diminish considerably
over the life of the contract, but his salary would not.
Salary should not be myopically looked upon as an expense. Rather it should be treated as an
investment. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal referred to this reality as Bottom-Line Ball
(Adams, 2007). In essence, this phenomenon is nothing more than a calculation of ROI. But of
course, the difficulty lies in determining the value of a player to place in the numerator of the
requisite equation. Only recently have we seen an effort to arrive at that bottom line figure. At the
forefront of this effort is J.C. Bradbury, author of the book, The Baseball Economist: The Real Game
Exposed (2007). And as noted earlier, it is generally believed that today’s general managers are more
adept at making decisions than were their predecessors. It appears that Moneyball has put forth a
number of issues that must be considered. Yet at the same time, it is likely that the criteria
articulated by Lewis in 2003 are in need of being updated. MLB needs to assume a mindset much
like any other for-profit enterprise; namely cash outlays should not be looked upon as expenses.
Rather they should be viewed as investments. Therefore, there needs to be an increased emphasis on
ROI.
The popular literature often casts the marketers of MLB as pariahs who have priced baseball out of
the reach of fans. Yet the strong positive correlation between payroll and attendance seems to
suggest that higher payrolls are not viewed in a negative light as long as they result in a better
product. It also says that MLB has been effective in establishing multiple price points, bundles, and
promotional pricing strategies that make the game accessible to most fans. This is a significant
advantage that MLB has over the other three major North American sports leagues.
MLB needs to acknowledge that it is one product that competes in an increasingly glutted
entertainment industry. It must be careful not to exacerbate the economic disconnect that was said
to be associated with ticket prices at the turn of the 21st century (Burton and Howard, 1999). As
such, there needs to be a concerted effort to implement effective market segmentation strategies and
incorporate those with pricing strategies that make sense for the various target markets. None other
than the New York Yankees discovered this reality upon the opening of the New Yankee Stadium in
2009. Within days of the start of the season, prices of the premium seats behind home plate had to be
embarrassingly slashed by some 50 percent.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has documented a number of key relationships within the realm of Major League
Baseball. However, there are many other variables that influence performance and attendance. For
example, a team moving towards 85 victories but still competing for a division championship may
draw more fans than a team progressing towards 93 victories while already being eliminated from
post-season competition. Future studies should seek to identify and incorporate these variables. It is
also evident, just within the data set used in this study, that there is significant multicollinearity.
So, in addition to incorporating additional variables, future research should expand beyond a series
of bivariate analyses. Multivariate analyses such as multiple regression or structural equation
modeling may help to clarify some of the uncertainty by explaining more of the variation in the
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dependent variables. It would also be interesting to replicate this study for a North American sports
league that has had a hard salary cap in place over the past ten years. The dilemma there is that
many teams play to capacity (or near to capacity) crowds during the regular season. For example, it
is hard to imagine a Green Bay Packers’ game that is not sold out. Thus, comparing MLB to the NFL
might be the proverbial comparison of apples to oranges.
We will never be able to accurately predict attendance at regular season MLB games; however, we
will continue to look for models that improve our predictive powers. In doing so, perhaps sports
entities can better determine how to invest so as to improve their product on the field of play and to
reap the rewards associated with their superior products.
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